‘Kashmir Insurgency: Revisiting 1989-90 and Deconstructing State Response’ by Yoginder Kandhari
‘Kashmir Insurgency’ focuses on the turbulent period of 1989-90 in Kashmir. However, to grasp the underlying reasons that caused the mayhem, the study traces the history from 1947 onwards, examining the involvement of India's adversarial neighbour and New Delhi's political missteps in Kashmir. The book captures the ground situation in the Valley during 1989-90 from the administrative and security perspectives. The author deliberately limited the study to 1991, believing that the insurgency in the Valley was still in its early stages and controllable. After that, the conflict escalated into asymmetric warfare, necessitating a different analytical approach.
Interview with the Author
The book traces Kashmir’s trajectory from 1947 onwards. Could you elaborate on which earlier political missteps—by Delhi or Srinagar—you see as most pivotal in contributing to the insurgency?
With the benefit of hindsight, the Central Government's dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 on charges of treason was its first major political misjudgment in Kashmir. While there were valid concerns about Sheikh’s loyalty to India and his ambitions for an independent Kashmir, his arrest only elevated his stature and lent credibility to his narrative. This was followed by the unceremonious removal of his successor, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, which further stoked communal sentiments in the Valley.
Subsequent missteps deepened the alienation. The Janata Party's political alliance with Maulvi Farooq, the Mirwaiz, before the 1977 Assembly elections, and Sheikh Abdullah's overtly communal campaign during the same period, polarised the electorate. The ousting of Farooq Abdullah in 1983 and the installation of his brother-in-law, G.M. Shah, as Chief Minister only added to the political instability. The final blow came with the massive rigging of the 1987 elections, which decisively pushed many disillusioned youths towards insurgent ideology.
Your book captures the ground-level administrative collapse during 1989–90. What were the most critical failings of the state institutions at that time that you covered in the book?
By late 1989, the administrative machinery in the Kashmir Valley had completely collapsed, creating a free-for-all situation. The Central Government, preoccupied with its survival, was led by a group of inept and self-serving politicians who had neither the will nor the vision to confront the growing insurgency. They failed to grasp the long-term consequences of their inaction.
The most serious failure, however, lay within the state’s administration—especially the police and intelligence services. Many local officials, instead of upholding the law, were either complicit or simply looked the other way. The intelligence network within the Valley had crumbled. Insurgents found refuge in police stations, and in some cases, received tacit support. Intelligence officers ignored the alarming reality of busloads of young men crossing into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in broad daylight for arms training.
Equally culpable were the Central Intelligence Agencies, which remained passive bystanders as the situation deteriorated. Either they failed to read the signs or lacked the courage to act on them. What do you call this—complicity, incompetence, or deliberate betrayal? Whatever the label, this dereliction of duty at every level enabled the insurgency to take deep root in the Valley.
How does your narrative assess intelligence lapses and the leadership vacuum during that period?
As previously discussed, the response of the political leadership and intelligence agencies during the critical phase of 1989–90 was lethargic, verging on neglect. The V.P. Singh-led National Front government appeared completely adrift. While earlier governments in New Delhi had at least some understanding of the Kashmir issue—despite their share of missteps—this government failed to grasp the gravity of the situation altogether.
Kashmir was effectively abandoned to its fate. The opportunistic manoeuvring of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and the erratic involvement of George Fernandes only added fuel to an already raging fire. Their actions, instead of stabilising the situation, aggravated the crisis and deepened the Centre’s disconnect from ground realities in the Valley.
The role of the central intelligence agencies during this period is equally troubling. As documented in the book, many had virtually ceased operations in the Valley following a spate of targeted killings of field operatives. Their near-total withdrawal signalled an unspoken acceptance of defeat. In my interviews with former officials, I found no credible or justifiable explanation for such a passive surrender at a time when a proactive response was most needed.
Given today's strategic posture in Kashmir, including responses such as “Operation Sindoor”, how do you believe India has evolved in its approach to cross-border proxy conflict and regional policy since 1990?
The issue is complex and multidimensional. While my primary focus has been on the events of 1989–90, it's important to view the current strategic posturing in a broader context. India's present stance is robust and well-calibrated, but its ultimate effectiveness is influenced by factors beyond India’s direct control.
Pakistan and its proxy assets continue to derive their relevance from the strategic calculations of other global powers, owing largely to Pakistan’s pivotal geostrategic location. It remains a key component in the long-term strategic agendas of both China and the United States—albeit for different reasons.
Operation SINDOOR served as a timely and pointed response—both to Pakistan and to the networks it supports—as a counter to the troubles they have persistently exported into Indian territory.
What gaps in those accounts of history does your book aim to fill, especially from a soldier‑author’s vantage point?
Most existing narratives on the Kashmir insurgency have focused almost exclusively on the role of Pakistan and the ideology of Islamic Jihad in fuelling the unrest. While my book does not absolve either of responsibility, it departs from the usual script by also turning the lens inward, on India’s failures that allowed the situation to spiral out of control.
Unlike other accounts, this book brings to light the other, often ignored, side of the story: the Indian state's inability to correctly assess the intent and scale of its adversaries’ designs, and its consistent failure to act decisively when the warning signs were unmistakably clear. The signs were written in bold letters, yet the response remained timid, fragmented, and, at times, dangerously complacent.
The central argument is that the insurgency could have been effectively contained up to 1991 if the Central Government had responded with the urgency, clarity, and coordination the situation demanded. Had appropriate measures been taken in time—politically, administratively, and militarily—the country could have been spared decades of bloodshed, economic drain, and the continued diversion of military resources to internal security, often at the cost of preparedness against external threats.
This book does not seek to malign institutions or individuals, but to offer an honest and unsparing reflection on the inadequacies of the state’s response. Its purpose is cautionary: to learn from the past and ensure that such lapses are not repeated in the face of future threats.
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From the Editor's desk
Vanshika Gupta